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LIBEL AND SLANDER IN ILLINOIS

by publishing his denial and making the charges without investigation
when they could have investigated. The court also noted that the matter
was handled all out of proportion to any news value. This conclusion was
reached by considering the amount of space used, the size of the print, and
the use of bold face print in parts. The court in conclusion summed up its
process for determining whether actual malice is present by saying all circumstances surrounding the transaction are proper for consideration. 83
RONALD

R.

EVANS

TRUTH AS A DEFENSE
In almost all jurisdictions a defendant in a civil action for defamation,
is excused from liability if he can prove the truth of his defamatory statements.' In Illinois, however, the relevant constitutional provision includes
additional language which has been interpreted as narrowing the old common law rule that truth is a perfect defense by adding the requirement that
"the truth, when published with good motives and for justifiable ends,
shall be a sufficient defense." 2 To what extent this additional language has
actually affected the law of defamation in Illinois will be considered below
in the section on "Good Motives and Justifiable Ends." But first, let us
assume that a defendant wishes to utilize the "truth" defense, and that he
can justify his motives and his ends after he has proven that he has told the
truth.
Several questions arise with respect to the truth defense which are not
always immediately apparent. Among them are these:
First, did the defendant say something which is susceptible of proof?
That is, did he make a verifiable assertion of a fact? Or did he merely express an opinion, a prediction, a supposition, or make some other kind of
statement which had no real factual content? If the critical comment, which
might otherwise be protected as "fair comment," is based on an erroneous
factual foundation, what effect does this have on the privilege of fair comment?
Second, exactly what did he say? If the material alleged to be defam88

Id. at 570, 64 N.E.2d 765.

1 Angoff, Handbook of Libel (1946).
2 Ill. Const. art. II, § 4: Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty; and in all trials for libel, both
civil and criminal, the truth, when published with good motives and for justifiable ends,

shall be a sufficient defense.
The provision has also been interpreted otherwise-as meaning only that these are the
limits beyond which government might not go in restricting civil or criminal defamation.
This second interpretation is more nearly consistent with a bill of rights whose purpose
is to enlarge rather than restrict personal liberty. Tilton v. Maley, 186 Ill. App. 307 (2d

Dist. 1914).
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atory is ambiguous or susceptible of more than one interpretation, which
interpretation shall it be given? What, precisely, did the defendant say?
This problem, and the "innocent construction rule," are discussed in another section of this symposium.
Third, how is the defendant permitted to establish the truth of the
defamatory statements he made? What evidence may he use? What evidence
is he barred from using? If conflicting evidence is offered by the plaintiff
and the defendant, who is to decide what is true?
Fourth, how accurately, how completely must the defendant prove the
truth of his statements? Is it sufficient for him to show that they are true
in general, that the gist of them is correct; or must he show that they are
true in every detail? Suppose he can establish the truth of part of what he
said, but not all of it. What effect will that have on the plaintiff's cause of
action or on the damages which he may recover?
Fifth, who has the burden of proof of truth, and to what degree must
it be proven? If the defendant has accused the plaintiff of a crime, must
the defendant prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, or is some lesser
degree of proof acceptable? Under what circumstances may the plaintiff be
required to prove the statements false, rather than the defendant be required to prove them true?
The first two groups of questions are discussed elsewhere in this symposium. This section is concerned only with questions of pleading and
proving truth as an affirmative defense.
PLEADING THE TRUTH

In early Illinois cases, as elsewhere, the defense of truth was strictly
construed against the defendant. In his plea of justification (truth) he was
required to allege that the statements complained of were true in every
particular.8 The extent to which this rule was followed can be shown by a
few examples drawn from some of the older cases.
In 1897, a dentist brought an action for slander, alleging that the defendant had accused him of incompetence and of using dangerous anesthetics. 4 In his plea of justification, the defendant asserted that the plaintiff used cocaine as an anesthetic, and that this was indeed a dangerous practice. However, the defendant's exact words had been: "The Rice brothers
will kill somebody if they don't quit using that anesthetic." Clearly, the
plea was not as broad as the charge. The defendant did not plead, as indeed he could not, that the statement, "The Rice brothers will kill some3 Dowie v. Priddle, 216 Ill. 553, 75 N.E. 243 (1905), affirming 116 11. App. 184 (lst
Dist. 1904); Rice v. AIeshire, 72 Ill. App. 455 (3d Dist. 1897); Commercial News Co. v.

Beard, 116 Ill. App. 501 (3d Dist. 1904); Cooper v. Lawrence, 204 Il1. App. 261 (lst Dist.
1917).

4 Rice v. Aleshire, supra note 3.
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body. . ." was true. The court cited a passage in Chitty on Pleading--one
which was frequently cited in these old cases-in which it was stated:
It is necessary that the plea should state specific facts, showing in
what particular instance and in what exact manner, the plaintiff
has misconducted himself.5
In 1905, in a case in which the local newspaper had printed a story
accusing the acting mayor of Danville of protecting open gambling in the
city,6 the defendant newspaper stated in its defense that the plaintiff had
known of the existence of a certain gambling house and, instead of suppressing it, had protected its operation. In holding the defendant's plea of
justification insufficient, the court said:
In this case it was necessary to state how, when, where and what
the plaintiff did or said in protection of the gamblers. A good plea
of justification to a declaration setting up the charge of felonious
stealing sets up that the plaintiff did feloniously steal certain goods
of a certain person of a certain value. It is necessary to state the
specific offense of which the plaintiff has been guilty with time
and place of commissionJ
Again, in Dowie v. Priddle,8 in which the general defamatory statements were that the plaintiff was "a vile person, the very opposite of pious,
a poor, ungrammatical ignoramus ...a scoundrel . . . an insane fanatic
...a paranoic... a low degraded person, lewd and depraved and a teacher
of lewd, adulterous and polygamous practices," the defendant pleaded and
was prepared to prove certain specific instances of depraved and immoral
behavior; but the court held this to be insufficient, stating that:
The plea must justify the very words contained in the declaration,
at least those that are actionable. In an action charging the plaintiff with adultery with one man, an answer that she had committed
adultery with another man is bad. It is not sufficient to plead and
prove the plaintiff guilty of a similar offense or even of one more
flagrant.9
Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the defense of truth
has been only rarely successful. Over a period of years, however, the artificial
restraints on pleading and proving the essential truth of the defamatory
statements came to be relaxed. One of the first Illinois cases to take a more
5 Id. at 460.

6 Commercial News Co. v. Beard, supra note 3.
7 Id. at 504.
App. 184 (1st Dist. 1904).
8 216 Ill. 553, 75 N.E. 243 (1905), affirming 116 I11.
9 Dowie v. Priddle, 116 Ill. App. 184, 192 (lst Dist. 1904). Accord, Sheahan v. Collins,
20 Ill. 326 (1858); lies v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co., 184 Ill. App. 63 (1st Dist. 1913).
The theory of these old cases is apparently that a defendant is not permitted to prove
the evil character of a plaintiff merely by adding up a series of individual evil acts.
In lies, for example, the court said: "In an action for libel, evidence of general bad
reputation of the plaintiff is admissible in mitigation of damages, but it is a general
rule that the character of a party cannot be impeached by proof of special damages."
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realistic attitude toward the defense of truth was Slaughter v. Johnson.1
In that case, the defamatory words were spoken by the plaintiff's sister-inlaw and included the following:

She is my brother's kept woman; she is a dirty, low vulgar woman;
she is a dirty little whore; she is my brother's mistress....
In the defendant's plea of justification, she alleged that from 1902 until September 1907 the plaintiff had been kept by the defendant's brother,
who operated a gambling house in Chicago until he died in 1907. At the
trial she offered to prove that her brother and the plaintiff had lived together from 1902 through 1905, and that they had had the occasion, the
opportunity, and the desire after that time until his serious illness and
subsequent death.
On appeal, the court stated the proof of these facts constituted a complete justification, stating that:
[P]roof of illicit relations of the plaintiff with a certain person, up
to the serious illness of that person, during which slanderous words
were uttered, constituted a justification of the charge of unchastity, although the charge was in the present tense."
In 1919, in Campbell v. Masonic Chronicler Publ. Co., 12 the defendant
newspaper had accused the plaintiff of falsely representing that he could
get anyone initiated into Masonry for $15.00, that he was a "clandestine
promoter" of Masonry, and "a crook, a confidence man, a lawbreaker, an
imposter, and a scoundrel." The defendant, in its plea of truth, alleged
facts as to the promotional activities of the plaintiff, but did not specifically
allege the truth of its other characterizations concerning the plaintiff's
character. The court, finding that the plea of justification was not sufficient,
pointed out:
It has even been stated that the plea of justification ought to state
the charge against the plaintiff with the same precision as an in3
dictment.'
To support that statement, it cited Cooper v. Lawrence14 and Dowie v.
Priddle,15 as well as the following statement from Chitty on Pleading:
...First, it is necessary, although the libel contain a general imputation upon the plaintiff's character, that the plea should state
specific facts, showing in what particular instances and in what
exact manner he has misconducted himself; secondly, the matters
set up by way of justification should be strictly conformable with
the slander laid in the declaration and must be proved as laid at
10 181 I.. App. 693 (1st Dist. 1913).
11 Id. at 699.
12 214 Ill. App. 601 (1st Dist. 1919).
13 Id. at 606.
14 204 I1. App. 261 (1st Dist. 1917).
15 216 Ill. 553, 75 N.E. 243 (1905), afirning 116 Ill. App. 184 (1st Dist. 1904).

LIBEL AND SLANDER IN ILLINOIS

least in substance; and thirdly, if the matter of justification can be
extended to the whole of the libel or slander, the plea should not
be confined to part only .... 16
The court then pointed out that "these rules seem to have been followed with some degree of strictness by the courts of Illinois."17 Apparently
Slaughter v. Johnson was an exception to the strict rules applying at the
time, but it was an exception which presaged a more liberal approach.
The question of the degree of exactness which a defense of truth must
possess came up again in McWilliams v. Sentinel Publishing Co.' s This was
an action which arose out of statements made by the defendant, the publisher of a Jewish newspaper, to the effect that the plaintiffs, who were
defendants in a trial in which they had been indicted for conspiracy with
Nazi officials, were traitors and pro-Fascists. In the lower court, some plaintiffs won; others did not. On appeal, the court held that the defendant
newspaper had submitted sufficient evidence to make a prima facie case in
support of its plea that the statements were true. The court noted that it
was not necessary that the statements be proven to be true with the same
degree of certainty as in a criminal trial and that there was evidence, in the
conduct of the plaintiffs themselves at trial, if nowhere else, that the
Sentinel's assessment of their character was substantially accurate.
In Cooper v. Illinois Publishing and Printing Co.,19 a case involving
criticism of a judge for his handling of sex cases, the appellate court instructed the trial court to permit the defendant to prove the truth of "as
many separate points as he can; if nothing significant remains unproven,
damages will be nominal." 20 Other aspects of this decision are discussed
elsewhere in this symposium. The importance of the holding was the
court's willingness to permit the defendant to prove the truth of as many
separate allegations as it could and its willingness to say that if the defendant could prove all of them, the plaintiff could recover only nominal
damages. This holding conflicts with the Ogren doctrine (discussed infra)
that truth alone is not a sufficient defense to an action for defamation.
The easing of the requirement that the defendant plead and prove the
truth of every detail of his defamatory statement made further progress in
Wilson v. United Press Ass'n.21 In that case, the defendant press association
reported that the "Supreme Court grants Wilson a New Hearing, Wilson,
now serving a 10-year sentence for assault with intent to kill his estranged
wife, has been granted a new trial ..
" The italicized words were incorrect; Wilson was not serving a sentence but was out on bond pending
16 Chitty on Pleading 605 (7th ed.).

Supra note 12, at 606.
18 339 111. App. 83, 89 N.E.2d 266 (1st Dist. 1949).
19 218 111. App. 95 (1st Dist. 1920).
17

20
21

Id. at 119.
543 Il. App. 238, 98 NE.2d 391 (1st Dist. 1951).
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appeal. The same error of fact was made in the official report on the case,
on which the United Press relied. The appellate court held that this error
was of secondary importance. The gist of the news report was that Wilson
had been improperly convicted, the report was substantially accurate and
22
fair, and therefore not actionable.
DEGREE OF PROOF

Early Illinois cases conflict with respect to the degree of proof required
of a defendant who pleads the truth as a defense. A series of cases in the
1870's and 1880's include statements to the effect that a plea of justification
(truth) must be sustained by a preponderance of the evidence.23 In Scott v.
Fleming,2 4 which involved an accusation that the plaintiff had lied on the
witness stand, the trial judge told the jury that before the defendant could
make out his pleas of justification, he must prove them beyond a reasonable
doubt. The Appellate Court reversed, saying that it was erroneous to
require that high a degree of proof.
On the other hand, in an 1866 slander case involving an accusation of
larceny, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that to sustain the plea of
justification the guilt of the party charged must be established beyond a
reasonable doubt and so far as the degree of proof is concerned, the plaintiff occupies the same position as if he were upon trial on an indictment for
2
the offense charged in the plea. 5
The same court followed this theory in the later case of Corbley v.
Wilson.26 More recent cases, however, seem less concerned with describing
the degree of proof required than with the question of whether or not the
defendant has successfully shown that his statements were accurate.
METHODS OF PROOF

Frequently defendants have attempted to utilize the defense of truth
by pleading and offering to prove that the plaintiff was generally believed
to have engaged in the improper behavior which the defendant attributed
to him, or that the defendant's statements were based on "usually reliable
sources" and the defendant believed them to be true. For example, in the
case of Spolek Denni Hlasatel v. Hoffman,27 the defendant sought to have
evidence admitted to prove the truth of his statements that the plaintiff was
untrue to her husband. The defamatory statements were in part these: "His
wife slighted him and sought elsewhere a substitute. .

.

. He saw his wife

begin to make love with the neighboring saloon keeper." The purpose of
22 Id. at 244, 98 N.E.2d at 393.
23 Tunnel v. Ferguson, 17 Ill. App. 76 (3d Dist. 1877); McDavid v. Blevins, 85 Ill. 238
(1885); Moore v. Maul, 3 Ill. App. 114 (4th Dist. 1878); Behrer v. Stock, 49 111. App. 270
(4th Dist. 1893).
24 17 Ill. App. 561 (2d Dist. 1885).

25 Crotty v. Morrissey, 40 111. 477 (1866).
26 71 Ill. 209 (1894).
27 204 Ill. 532, 68 N.E. 400 (1903).
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the excluded evidence was to show that the defamatory statements were
made on the strength of a statement of one apparently cognizant of the
facts, and that the defendant believed the facts to be true.
In upholding the exclusion of the proffered evidence, the Illinois
Supreme Court said that a defendant will not be permitted to prove truth
by rumor or hearsay which violates the rules of evidence. 28 This holding,
however, does not appear to eliminate the possibility of having such evidence admitted in mitigation of damages, as proof that actual malice was
not present.
In Stephens v. Commercial News Co., 29 the defendant newspaper had
charged the plaintiff with renting rooms for immoral purposes and with
pandering. The defendant attempted to assert as a defense the "record
libel" privilege of reporting judicial proceedings, but the court held that
since the plaintiff had only been arrested and not tried for the offenses
mentioned in the defendant's news story, and since the defendant secured
all its information from the police, there had been as yet no judicial proceeding and the qualified privilege of record libel did not apply. The
defendant, said the court, had no right to rely on statements merely because
they originated with the police, and they were not admissible to support
his effort to utilize the defense of truth.
The Stephens case was cited and followed in the case of O'Malley v.
Illinois Publishingand PrintingCo.,3 0 which also turned on the question of
what kind of evidence could be used to support a defense of truth. The
defendant, which published the Chicago Examiner, published an article
stating that the plaintiff, "saloon and divekeeper," was "one of the most
notorious gambling bosses Chicago -has ever had." The article added that
the plaintiff was the head of "an organization for colonizing illegal votes
and was known as the North Side representative of the graft ring." The
plaintiff did in fact operate a saloon at Kinzie and Clark in Chicago, and
evidence developed during the trial covered many facets of Chicago underworld life.
The defendant's star witness was one of its reporters; much of his
testimony was hearsay and he felt constrained to protect his sources. Witnesses for the defendant newspaper did testify that they themselves had
made payoffs to O'Malley, but this evidence was not directly probative of
the accusations that he was "colonizing illegal votes" and was the North
Side head of the "graft ring." On appeal from a verdict for the plaintiff, the
court held that the admissible evidence-not including the hearsay-did
not support the charges made by the defendant and that since it was
offered in an effort to make a defense of truth, it was not admissible in
mitigation of damages (to show absence of actual malice). This holding
Id. at 538, 68 N.E. at 403.
164 Ill. App. 6 (3d Dist. 1911).
30 194 Ill. App. 544 (1st Dist. 1915).
28
29
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appears to be contrary to the les caseA' and is inconsistent with the idea
that injury to a good reputation should cost the defendant more than
injury to an already ruined reputation.
THE ESSENTIAL TRUTH

As has been pointed out above, the old idea that the truth should correspond exactly with the defamation if it is to be asserted as a defense has
become somewhat modified. The question arises whether the more liberal
rule is applied to newspapers and news reports while the strict rule is still
applied to statements made by private persons in private conversations or
correspondence. Is the essential truth good enough for the press, but the
exact truth required of private persons? Perhaps the two approaches can be
illustrated by these two cases.
A case illustrating an application of the requirements of strict truth is
Burns v. Hicks.3 2 In that case the defendant had written and mailed a letter
to certain persons, in which he stated that the plaintiff-president of an
association of which the defendant and the recipients of the letters were
members-had embezzled association funds which had been intended for
the construction of a building for the association. The defendant's letter
went on to say that the plaintiff had used these funds for other purposes,
"mainly to pay his own salary," and that this constituted embezzlement
under the laws of the states of Illinois and Indiana since the plaintiff could
not legally use the money except for the construction of the building. The
court held that the defendant had not proven a case of embezzlement, but
"at most a breach of trust," and that therefore the truth defense was insufficient. The court did, however, reverse the verdict for plaintiff and
remanded the case to consider evidence that the defendant had consulted
an attorney as admissible in mitigation of damages.
A case illustrating the more liberal view is Rose v. IndianapolisNewspapers,3 3 decided in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The
Indianapolis Star ran a story about the plaintiff stating that she had "slain"
her husband. The headline was: "Atterbury GI Slain by War Bride." A
subhead read: "News Kept Concealed Two Days." A coroner's jury found
that the plaintiff had indeed killed her husband but that the killing was
accidental. The State Police and U.S. Army authorities did keep the story
under wraps pending the inquest. The court found the story "essentially
accurate" and did not admit that slain might be synonymous with "murdered." Citing 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander § 122, the court held that "the
essential truth of a news report is always a defense to an action for libel."
FINDING THE

TRUTH

The cases already discussed deal primarily with whether or not evidence supporting a "truth defense" will be permitted to reach the jury and
31
32
33

Iles v. Inter-Ocean Newspaper Co., 184 Ill. App. 63 (lst Dist. 1913).
242 Il1. App. 198 (lst Dist. 1926).
213 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1954).
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whether or not, if what is pleaded is proven, it will be sufficient to support
a truth defense. There is only one case in the Illinois reports on the role of
the jury in determining the truth. In Inland Printer Co. v. Economical
Half Tone supply Co.8 4 the defendant, which published a trade journal for
the printing industry, published a story in which it said that the plaintiff
was manufacturing and marketing a printing process for which its advertising made untrue claims. The plaintiff manufacturer claimed that the story
was false and malicious; the defendant admitted publication and in its plea
"alleged it was lawful for them to publish it in the interest of the trade,
that they published it with good motives and justifiable ends, and that the
article was true in substance and in fact."
After a judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant appealed. On
remand, the court discussed the function of the jury in a case such as this
in which the evidence was conflicting. The court said that although the
defendant may have shown that certain specific statements which the plaintiff used in its advertising were untrue, "it was for the jury to determine
from all the evidence whether the plea was sustained, i.e., whether the evidence established that the device was a 'humbug,' worthless and unfitted for
use, and therefore that the appellee was dishonest in advertising and selling
it." Since the evidence was conflicting, and there was support for the jury's
finding for the plaintiff, the court said that the finding should be respected.
BURDEN

OF PROOF AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Throughout this discussion of truth as a defense to an action for
defamation, it has been assumed that the burden of pleading and proving
the truth rested on the defendant. In other words, defamatory statements
are presumed by law to be false, and it is up to the defamer to assert and
prove them to be at least essentially true.3 5 In one important area, discussed infra, in the section entitled Defamation of Public Officials, this approach has been radically changed by the United States Supreme Court on
constitutional grounds. In New York Times v. Sullivan,36 the Court took
the position that the constitutional protection of free speech does not rest
upon the truth of what is spoken, that to require one who criticizes the
public conduct of public officials to guarantee the exact truth of his statements or be penalized by the exaction of an indefinite amount of damages
would unconstitutionally inhibit free speech. In New York Times, the
Court shifted the burden of proof from the speaker to the defamed public
official by saying that such an official may not recover unless he proves both
that the statement was false and that it was made with actual malice. The
implications of this shift in the burden of proof are discussed further below.
Ms. B. SIDLER
84 99 111. App. 8 (1st Dist. 1901).
85 Cooper v. Illinois Publ. and Printing Co., 218 Il1. App. 95 (lst Dist. 1920).
86 376 U.S. 254, 84 Sup. Ct. 710 (1965).

